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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a general micro-theoretical framework 
that helps to understand the embeddedness of trade unions within the European system of 
industrial relations, and the consequences of this embeddedness for industrial relations 
outcomes. First, starting from the paradoxical observation of a trend towards 
homogeneity within a complex, multi-layered European industrial relations system 
consisting of heterogeneous and autonomous agents, the paper aims to explicate the 
mechanisms which produce these similarities. Second, the paper seeks to analyse 
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potential mechanisms for trans-national trade union cooperation and third, it concludes 
by outlining its applicability as the basis for methodological approaches which enable 
realistic and policy relevant analyses   
Design/methodology/approach - This paper is conceptual and focuses on the 
development of a general micro-theoretical framework which captures European 
industrial relations actors’ behaviour and outcomes. It integrates theoretical and empirical 
accounts from differing social science disciplines and from various methodological 
starting points on trade union action and interaction into one general micro-theoretical 
framework.   
Findings - Starting from a typology of trade union goals, we show how various social 
mechanisms lead to interdependencies between trade unions and review empirical 
evidence for their consequences. We then identify a set of motives for transnational 
cooperation that would allow outcomes that are in line with trade union objectives. 
Originality/value – Against the background that previous studies on trade union action 
and cross-national interaction have paid less attention to the puzzling stylized fact that 
industrial relations outcomes are mimicked by heterogeneous and autonomous agents 
actors in different countries, we address this research gap by developing a novel general 
micro-theoretical framework for the analysis of trans-national trade union action and 
interaction in order to better understand the underlying causal mechanisms for the 
common behaviour and outcomes of autonomous actors. 
Keywords Cooperation, Microfoundations, Complexity, Trade unions, Europe  
Paper type Research paper  
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Introduction 
 
It is well documented in the industrial relations literature that actors, i.e. social partners, 
and processes are very different in different European countries (e.g. Erne 2008; Ferner 
and Hyman 1998; Marginson and Sisson 2004). In all European countries there are 
distinct types of industrial relations systems embedded in different institutional national 
frameworks (e.g. European Commission 2015). Even though in recent decades the 
transnational context has become increasingly important, the national arena for social 
partners’ action and interaction remains the most relevant (Keune and Marginson 2013). 
From a transnational perspective, the European industrial relations system 
emerged and transformed within distinct country traditions (e.g. Crouch 1993) and is 
currently constituted by the presence of many heterogeneous and autonomous actors in 
each country which differ in terms of their domain and which act on different levels. 
Actors are heterogeneous as they differ from country to country in terms of their 
institutional and organisational structure (e.g. the level at which they are organized), their 
role and scopes of activities (e.g. the legal rights and obligations they have) and in terms 
of their interests. As regards different interests of different actors, there are various 
differences not only between distinct actors in different countries and sectors but 
regarding various dimensions of interaction. For example actors in smaller countries have 
other interests than actors in larger countries. Actors have different interests vis-á-vis 
other actors in the same country and in other countries (Furåker and Bengtsson 2013; 
Traxler and Brandl 2009). Again, from a transnational perspective, actors are autonomous 
as their actions and decisions are usually not bound by any form of constraint or by any 
binding transnational top-down or bottom-up cooperation initiative. The outcome of the 
manifold and different forms and attempts of transnational cooperation was just that the 
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complexity of horizontal and vertical interaction increased as new levels, transnational 
actors and institutions were introduced (Keune and Marginson 2013: 474). 
Against the background of this complex and multi-layered European system of 
industrial relations with its myriad of heterogeneous and in particular autonomously 
acting agents, it is somewhat paradoxical that the developments in industrial relations 
follow very similar patterns, or trajectories. As regards industrial relations outcomes, on 
which we concentrate in this article, in all countries, the wage share has fallen for more 
than three decades (e.g. Stockhammer 2013). As regards collective wage agreements, the 
pattern and development is similar and there is a common trend of declining collectively 
agreed real wages (e.g. Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014). The same pattern applies to strike 
activity: there is a common trend in almost all countries that strike activity has declined 
(Brandl and Traxler 2010; Kelly 2015). But also regarding the transformation of industrial 
relations actors, institutions and processes, common trends, or common trajectories, can 
be observed. For example, Baccaro and Howell (2011) identified a strong common trend 
towards institutional deregulation, i.e. decentralization of collective bargaining.  
Paradoxically, these common, i.e. European-wide, developments are not 
“planned”, “governed”, “guided” or “controlled” from above (top-down) as one might 
expect in the case of common development. Even though some actors in some European 
countries in some periods have recently had to face constraints with respect to their scope 
of action, e.g. in the context of the Troika and the new economic governance system of 
the European Union (e.g. Bieler and Erne 2015; Brandl and Bechter 2017), there is 
certainly no strong “leader” or any other form of “hegemonic authority” which pushes or 
pulls in a particular direction. Nor is there any (empirical) evidence for an “invisible 
hand” which “guides” common development in all countries. Quite the opposite, this 
behaviour appears to emerge from the bottom up. 
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Against the background that, first, industrial relations institutions, processes and 
actors in Europe are still very heterogeneous, second, are acting predominantly in an 
autonomous way and third, their actions are not planned or guided from above, the 
question arises: What is the reason for this common development? In other words, where 
is this common behaviour or this order coming from? What are the causal mechanisms 
behind the similar behaviour of different actors? 
Given that the actions of many heterogeneous, autonomous and uncoordinated 
actors lead to the same outcome, at first glance, it seems reasonable to suspect that the 
answer to the previous questions lies in common macro-factors, such as increasing 
globalisation, which influence individual actions and explain common patterns in the 
development of outcomes (e.g. Marginson 2015; Marginson and Sisson 2004; 
Ramskogler 2013; Traxler and Brandl 2009). The causal mechanisms behind the 
relevance of such macro-factors were intensively discussed in the context of institutional 
change, i.e. change in processes and actors (e.g. Morgan and Hauptmeier 2014), but less 
regarding outcomes. Furthermore, whilst there is no doubt that many of these factors are 
relevant, the way in which these factors matter, i.e. the causal mechanisms, requires 
further explanation (e.g. Baccaro and Howell 2011: 552), because these factors might 
also be used to explain a completely different set of developments.  
Whether such factors can be considered to be sufficient to explain phenomena in 
industrial relations or not draws directly on very old controversies over the superiority of 
macro- and micro-theories, methodological individualism and methodological 
collectivism and the need for a micro foundation for macro-phenomena (e.g. Pulignano 
and Doerflinger 2017). These controversies are of course extensively discussed in social 
science literature (e.g. Collins 1981) and in the context of industrial relations (e.g. Thelen 
1999: 377-8). The main contribution of our paper is to provide a general theoretical, i.e. 
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conceptual, framework. The theoretical framework is based on a structural-individualist 
perspective, which is individualist in the sense of focusing on actors and their behaviour, 
but also structural in the sense of viewing actors as fundamentally embedded in social 
contexts.  
An important feature of this perspective is that it recognizes the importance of 
social structure in shaping individual actors’ interests and choices, and it does not treat 
the impact of this as deterministic but allows for agency of the actors. As regards relevant 
actors, for reasons of space, the framework presented in the paper focuses on the 
discussion on trade unions, i.e. on one (or even the) key type of actor, even though the 
framework can be augmented to other actors. Nevertheless, we argue that this framework, 
without considering other actors such as employers or the state in great detail, is able to 
detail sufficient causal mechanisms for observed transnational patterns of influence and 
commonalities by showing how trade unions in Europe act and interact with each other 
transnationally. This is important, because it shows how trade unions, even without the 
interference of other actors, face problems as well as opportunities merely by considering 
their structural embeddedness vis-à-vis each other. To this end, we show how known 
mechanisms of trade union interaction can be applied to the transnational context.   
This gives us reason to revisit previous theoretical explanations of macro-
phenomena in the field of European industrial relations in the next section. We then 
explain that the key to the understanding of aggregate European level outcomes can be 
found in trade union actions, for which we derive and systemize their goals and interests 
in this paper. We then outline how individual trade union action depends upon interaction 
with others and what the motives for coordination are and then explain the necessity to 
embed trade union actions in a network of interrelated action. On the basis of this we 
categorize different forms of interaction and cooperation. Finally we conclude by 
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presenting a novel approach in the field of industrial relations, i.e. an agent based model 
approach. We explain that this approach not only has the advantage of providing an 
understanding and grounded explanation of phenomena in European industrial relations, 
but also why and how this methodological approach can be useful for any attempts at 
European industrial relations governance. 
 
Explaining common behaviour of autonomous actors: from factors to actors 
 
There is no disagreement in literature about the diversity and heterogeneity of 
autonomous industrial relations actors in Europe (e.g. European Commission 2015; 
Marginson and Sisson 2004), as well as the fact that the development of industrial 
relations outcomes has been very similar in all countries. This increased similarity in the 
development of industrial relations includes both qualitative and quantitative outcomes 
such as the cross-national trend towards an increased precariousness of working 
conditions (e.g. Doellgast 2012), an increase in non-standard working arrangements (e.g. 
Pulignano 2017), a transformation in the forms of industrial conflicts (e.g. Kelly 2015; 
Vandaele 2014) and last, but not least, as another example in the development of 
collectively agreed wages (e.g. Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014). As regards the latter, Figure 
1 not only shows that for European countries for which data is available, there is a 
declining trend in collectively agreed wages and some convergence between countries, 
but also that the pattern of development over time shows significant similarities. This 
similar development in collectively agreed wages is clearly expressed by the upwards and 
downwards peaks since the economic crisis hit Europe in 2008.     
 
- Insert Figure 1 about here - 
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The fact that basically heterogeneous and autonomous actors are doing very 
similar things which lead to very similar outcomes is somehow surprising. Indeed, the 
rationale behind these commonalities of heterogeneous, and autonomous actors is weakly 
explored and still puzzling, as the individual actions are not governed by “something from 
above”. Thus it appears to be advantageous to take a closer look at the motives of 
individual actors. 
Industrial relations systems have their roots in the industrial revolution and 
evolved over time (e.g. Crouch 1993). Nowadays these systems are multi-dimensional 
and consist of complex sets of differing actors influencing numerous aspects of economic, 
political and social life. For reasons of simplicity and analytical clarity, this article focuses 
on the development of a general micro-theoretical framework which captures only the 
actions and interactions of one type of corporate actor (Coleman 1982), i.e. trade unions. 
In addition, we will concentrate on exemplifying outcomes of trade union actions on 
outcomes of wage setting which translates to macro-aggregates, such as the wage share, 
though the mechanisms are likely to be applicable for a wider range of outcomes such as 
for example the increasing precariousness of working conditions and the growth of non-
standard working arrangements. The focus on trade unions as corporate actors is 
legitimate as trade unions are capable of making their own choices and representing their 
own goals (e.g. Scharpf 1997). Studying other actors, in particular employers and 
employers’ organisations, would also certainly be beneficial, but does not limit the 
general conceptual approach of action and interaction developed in this work as unions 
are not only the key actors in relevant disciplines of social sciences including, most 
notably in comparative industrial relations (e.g. Kelly 1998), but also it is trade unions 
actions (or non-actions in specific contexts and situations) which are central in explaining 
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how and why aggregate industrial relations outcomes in Europe developed as they did in 
the recent past. More specifically, it is in the main interest of trade unions and not of 
employers and employers’ organisations to strategically act and interact transnationally 
since the development of industrial relations outcomes in the recent past so favours the 
employers’ side (e.g. Traxler and Brandl 2009:181). Thus in order to “reverse” any trends 
or change the situation it depends largely on trade unions actions. Against this background 
and to simplify the micro-theoretical framework, we focus on trade unions only.  
In this article, the micro-theoretical framework of analysis of European 
commonalities in industrial relations outcomes as well as of transnational trade union 
cooperation in wage setting rests on the frameworks of causal mechanisms developed by 
Elster (1989a), Hedström and Swedberg (1996), Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), and 
Merton (1967). These frameworks enable us to explicate social mechanism that generate 
such similarities and thus are able to explain macro-phenomena. What is to be explained 
then is not how isolated wage bargains lead to certain individual outcomes, but rather, 
how these bargains lead to more or less homogeneity within the transnational system. 
This means that the level of transnational homogeneity is taken as a macro level 
characteristic. In order to better understand how homogeneity arises, theoretical 
considerations about lower level (e.g. Stinchcombe 1991) individual industrial relations 
actors (i.e. trade unions) and their orientations towards other actors are discussed.  
Giving primacy to explanations of social phenomena as a result of the actions of 
individual agents within social systems is typically known as methodological 
individualism. It is, however, important to recognize that there exist different versions of 
methodological individualist approaches (e.g. Udehn 2002), varying from those that 
explain social phenomena purely as the outcomes of individual (inter)action, to those that 
prominently invoke institutional and social-structural contexts of individual action. The 
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perspective taken in this article is that understanding macro-level phenomena improves 
if underlying generating mechanisms resulting from individual purposive action are 
explicated, but individual action itself is shaped by institutional context (e.g. Agassi 1975; 
Pulignano and Doerflinger 2017) and social structure (see also Coleman 1986, 1990; 
Hedström and Swedberg 1996). This viewpoint has also been referred to as structural 
individualism (e.g. Raub 1982), as it stresses the importance of the individual actor’s 
position and relation to other actors in the social system in determining preferences and 
beliefs. The basis of social theory here thus does not consist of  “...mutually independent 
actions performed by atomistic individuals. Rather, individuals’ actions typically are 
oriented toward others, and their relations to others therefore are central when it comes 
to why they do what they do” (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 59). Individual action is thus 
seen as embedded within systems of social relations (Granovetter 1985).  
Indeed, the notion that the actions of individual, autonomous actors in social 
systems are influenced by the actions of others has long been at the core of sociological 
thinking (Weber [1921-1922]1978: 22-24). Actions may be oriented towards others or 
the observation of the behaviour of others may reveal factual information that affects the 
individual’s actions (Ibid 1978). Thus any micro-theoretical approach needs to explain 
not only what actors, i.e. in this article, unions, want and what their preferences are but 
also how these preferences interact and depend upon others. We start by setting out core 
trade union goals based on previous developed theoretical considerations. These goals are 
by no means exhaustive; rather we identify those that can be considered most dominant 
and sufficient to furnish the mechanisms needed to explain transnational trade union 
interaction.  
Trade union goals: What do unions want? 
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An actor-based approach to trade unions calls for a theory of trade union goals, i.e. their 
preferences. As will become clear, different goals may or may not align, and aiming to 
fulfil these goals may have intended as well as unintended consequences when taking into 
account the embeddedness of trade union action. In this section, a general actor model is 
discussed with the help of a typology of trade union goals, based on three elements: (i) 
maximization in wage bargaining; (ii) reference dependence on fairness preferences; and 
(iii) ideology.  
The type of trade union goal views trade unions as self-interested decision makers 
seeking to ensure organizational survival, i.e. membership, by maximizing wages and 
employment through wage bargaining. This conception of trade union objectives is 
prevalent in rational choice theories and finds its origin in Dunlop’s (1944) “Wage 
Determination under Trade Unions”, e.g. see Kaufman (2002). At its core, it defines 
unions as organisations which aim to maximize the utility of their membership in 
balancing wage rates and the level of employment (e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984).  
The second type of trade union goal broadly stated is the achievement of fair 
outcomes. Thus, whilst it would be hard to deny that trade unions aim to achieve high 
wages, and that they must balance wage increases against job losses, this portrayal of 
union objectives is incomplete. The reason for this is that in this approach, the preferences 
of trade unions and/or the workers they represent are assumed to be independent from 
social context. This assumption of independent preferences has been criticized throughout 
the development of wage determination literature (early examples include Hicks 1932: 
138; Ross 1948). Rather, it is commonly argued that trade unions seek to negotiate wages 
that workers consider to be fair (e.g. Hyman and Brough 1975; Rees 1993). What is fair 
in the context of trade union wage determination is however judged by making 
comparisons, i.e. fairness is a relational concept (Turnbull 2003: 499; Western and 
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Rosenfeld 2011). In this way, wages negotiated elsewhere become potential reference 
points (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) against which the first wage is judged. The 
resulting reference dependence of preferences is therefore a second important element of 
trade union goals. Trade unions aim to achieve wages that are fair, and fairness is judged 
by comparing to wages achieved elsewhere.   
The third type of trade union goal refers to their ideology, i.e. a system of 
normative political beliefs. Trade unions are not only market actors (e.g. Kelly 1998; 
Turnbull 1988) but also political organizations. The political face of unions has received 
attention regarding internal goal formation and principal-agent problems between union 
leaders and members (e.g. Ross 1948;) and in particular as being pillars of a moral 
economy in modern labour markets in which unions are the stronghold of equity and 
social justice (Western and Rosenfeld 2011: 517-8). An upshot of the political nature of 
trade unions is that their objectives are deeply affected by ideological considerations. 
Specifically, the core element of trade union ideology that is relevant for our purposes is 
solidarity, i.e. striving for communality in defending workers’ interests even when this 
entails compromising one’s one payoffs. This appreciation of trade unions as political 
organizations is important because it “...raises the possibility of (conditional) altruism and 
solidarity as opposed to universal egoism and free-riding” (Turnbull 2003: 498).  
Trade union action can thus be summarized as purposive towards maximizing a 
trade-off between wages and employment, simultaneously taking into account relativities 
between wages elsewhere and the wages realized in the current wage negotiation, while 
also balancing these goals with ideological motivations. However, though it can be easily 
assumed that all trade unions share the same general goals, this does not necessarily imply 
that all trade unions are doing the same, i.e. that the outcome of their actions is the same. 
Unions can have very different perceptions in how to balance wage increases against job 
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losses. They can also differ in terms of their perceptions of fairness as well as differ in 
their ideological considerations. The weights of all these elements of action depend very 
much on external factors which define and constrain their individual actions. 
Social mechanisms: from intentional coordination to unintentional influence  
 
On the basis of the trade union goals we identify a number of different causals 
mechanisms that can account for the international interdependence of trade union action. 
In order to systematize such mechanisms, we differentiate between three forms of 
interdependency: (i) explicit coordination initiatives, (ii) implicit coordination via norms, 
to (iii) unintentional influence via spillovers. All three forms explicitly recognize trade 
union as fundamentally embedded in a network of trade unions.  
The first form of trade union interdependency covers various explicit cooperation 
initiatives. In the European employee relations context, a number of forms of cooperation 
activities exist. Some of these are based on top-down initiatives originating from the 
European Union or from European trade union organisations, in particular the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). The rationale behind top-down initiatives, which 
put some pressure on common unions’ action, is that autonomous unions which are 
embedded in different country specific environments might not overcome the problems 
of cooperation described by Olson (1965). Most notably is the top-down initiative by the 
European Union via the European Social Dialogue and the European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue (e.g. Keune and Marginson, 2013; Marginson, 2016). Other top-down 
coordination activities were initiated by the ETUC and its European Industry Federations 
and some even emerged, with some support from top-down, from the bottom-up. Most 
notably, bottom up cooperation between national unions in neighbouring countries (e.g. 
Gollbach and Schulten 2000; Larsson 2014; Marginson and Sisson 2004) emerged.  
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A second form of transnational trade union interdependency is implicit and works 
via norms. In this form of interdependence, one union acts first and other unions 
intentionally act in a similar way. This form of cooperation is usually known as pattern 
bargaining. Even though the pattern bargaining  can vary across countries in its function 
and form, the common denominator is that this form of interdependence functions by the 
attempt to achieve the same or related outcome in separate negotiations (Sisson and 
Marginson 2002). In this sense, pattern bargaining can be considered as a bottom-up form 
of cooperation as unions decide autonomously if they want to follow others. So far there 
are empirical studies which show that outcomes, i.e. wage agreements, are intentionally 
used as an important reference point for the individual actions of trade unions in 
neighbouring countries (e.g. Larsson 2014; Ramskogler 2013; Traxler and Brandl 2009). 
This causal mechanism of interdependence is intentional rather than non-intentional as 
unions decide autonomously to follow others or not.  
However, not all interdependencies and commonalities in outcomes are the result 
of intentional efforts to cooperate. A third form of interdependence exists via 
unintentional spill-overs. Spill-overs occur when one outcome of one union action 
unintentionally affects outcomes elsewhere. Basically two mechanisms for spill-overs 
can be differentiated. One is based on the maximization of goals exclusively and has been 
referred to as learning; the other is founded on the reference-dependence of preferences 
and is labelled as social comparisons (Lehr et al. 2014).  
The social comparisons mechanism was developed by Festinger (1954) and rests 
on the assumption that individuals judge themselves relative to others who are perceived 
as similar. With respect to our context this suggests that unions judge their wage 
agreements against the wage agreements of others, making fairness a fundamental 
criterion for action (e.g. Adams 1963). Each outcome, i.e. wage agreement achieved by 
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other unions (e.g. in other companies, sectors or countries) may potentially be a point of 
reference. Now the important question becomes: which reference points are relevant. So 
far there is empirical support that there are two criteria for selecting reference points. 
First, the outcomes of others in the same sector carries more weight than outcomes in 
other sectors (Lehr et al. 2014). This suggests that perceived similarity is tied to the sector. 
Second, comparisons are subject to self-serving biases (Babcock et al. 1996; Rees 1993) 
as outcomes perceived as favourable have more influence than less favourable ones.  
The learning mechanism has been advocated as a further explanation for 
unintentional cooperation via spill-overs (e.g. Kuhn and Gu 1999). According to this 
mechanism, trade unions will learn by observing the outcomes and actions of others if 
others are more successful in achieving their goals in a similar situation. Such situations 
can be expected for example when unions in the same sector, but in other countries, 
experience similar product market conditions. While the learning mechanism predicts that 
favourable outcomes will be imitated, it also predicts that unfavourable outcomes will 
cause unions to make lower demands. Evidence suggests that spill-overs occur both due 
to social comparisons and learning depending on information conditions and that neither 
mechanism may be prevailing within a national economy (Lehr et al. 2014). On the basis 
of empirical evidence so far, both mechanisms agree that unintentional influence via spill-
overs mainly occurs within sectors. In the past, spill-overs were considered exclusively 
as occurring within nationally confined sectors (e.g. Vroman 1982). However, within the 
changing network of European industrial relations in which the context within sectors 
across borders has become increasingly similar (e.g. Bechter et al. 2012), the possibility 
of transnational spill-overs must be considered increasingly relevant as one form of 
interdependence.  
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The bottom line of all three theoretical forms of interdependence is that 
commonalities in industrial relations outcomes can be expected. Whether such 
commonalities signify, as often held, a common race to the bottom, or not however is not 
a priori clear. For example, one could expect that via explicit cooperation initiatives, the 
goals of trade unions can be achieved and thus high or increasing wages, but also 
according to our union’s goals, equity and fairness. This is not necessarily the result of 
cooperation via implicit cooperation via norms if the wage leader is, for example, 
following a wage moderation strategy (e.g. German unions). It is also not necessarily the 
result of unintentional cooperation via spill-overs mechanisms of action if low wage 
increases are the reference.  
 
The outcome of union embeddedness in the European context 
 
In Europe, one of the most striking features of the development of important outcomes of 
trade union action is the common downward-spiral in wages and working conditions (e.g. 
Meardi et al. 2013). With reference to the trade unions goals described earlier, this 
suggests that trade unions have been less and less able to maximise their primary goals, 
i.e. to raise the wages of employees and/or secure jobs as well as to pursue fairness goals. 
Why is this so?  
As regards the context for union actions and interactions, there is some evidence 
which suggests that decreasing wage shares coincides with increasing openness of 
economies (e.g. Stockhammer 2013) and it may therefore be assumed that these factors 
play an important part in limiting trade unions capacity. The increased openness of 
national economies has led to increased possibilities for transnational mobility of both 
labour and in particular capital. Employers are increasingly able to shift production to 
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low wage regions (e.g. Streeck 1992) while labour can be drafted from other countries 
with greater ease and often under non-unionized arrangements. The upshot is that the 
power of national unions to raise wages decreases (e.g. Rodrik 1997). However, as 
regards the openness of the European common market, the situation is rather a closed 
market rather than an open market. In fact, the European Union can be considered a 
closed market. Even though the openness increases both the shares of imports and exports 
of all goods and services are lower than in the majority of member countries many 
decades ago (e.g. Eurostat 2014) in which trade unions were considered to have a high 
bargaining power. Therefore, a European- wide cooperation of unions is essential and 
would enable unions to escape from the downward-spiral of outcomes.   
However, the developments can be recast as stemming from the increased 
significance of another type of trade union interdependency. Trade unions increasingly 
have to take into account what their transnational counterparts do. The consequence for 
cooperation of trade unions is that coordination became increasingly difficult because the 
number of actors has increased, i.e. the network of trade union interaction became much 
bigger and more complex. Unlike under multi-unionism within countries, there is very 
limited or even no competition over membership between these trade unions in different 
countries. However, their strategic decisions must account for the potential loss of 
employment covered by their negotiated collective agreements with other countries. This 
would imply a stalemate among unions operating in the same sectors in different 
countries, as no union can unilaterally raise its wage demands without risking job losses 
for their members. Thus, even discounting any attempts by other actors, such as for 
instance business or government, to thwart unions, unions’ embeddedness poses a 
problem for their ability to pursue their own interests.  
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Elements of union cooperation: the cement of unions’ order 
 
The problem is that no union can achieve its goals unless cooperation from their 
(transnational) counterparts can be ensured. By looking at the development of outcomes 
in Europe, one might posit that there is therefore a problem of cooperation.  
Given the background that European industrial relations outcomes developed in a 
detrimental way to trade union goals and that unions could more effectively push their 
goals by transnational cooperation the question arises, why are unions not cooperating 
and interacting strategically (more)? So far as literature is concerned there have been two 
main approaches: Firstly the question was addressed at a general level from a rational 
choice collective action perspective on the basis of the seminal work of Olson (1965) 
which concentrates on the relevance of common interests as well as the need for coercion 
and incentives to act collectively. Alternatively, case study research, which usually 
complements Olson (1965), has been used which investigates different and specific forms 
of common and coordinated transnational cooperation of different unions. The majority 
of these case studies focus on the problems and obstacles which explain the difficulties 
for transnational cooperation. Some of these studies analyse coordination initiatives of 
trade unions (e.g. Erne 2008; Furåker and Bengtsson 2013; Larsson 2012, 2014; 
Marginson and Sisson 2004; Meardi, 2012), others explicitly in the European Union 
supported initiatives of collective bargaining (e.g. Keller and Weber 2011) and others 
even on work-place initiatives (e.g. Meardi et al. 2013; Müller et al. 2011; Pulignano 
2017).  
However, the fundamental question is: how can unions achieve sufficient 
cooperation? Referring to Leist (2011: 21), who derives the concept mainly from Parsons 
(1937) and Elster (1989b), the answer can be found in different motives for cooperation: 
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(i) cooperation under self-interest, (ii) cooperation on communal interests, (iii) altruistic 
cooperation, and (iv) cooperation through norms. 
Self-interested cooperation refers to situations in which cooperation is to the 
benefit of all actors involved. In the case of non-conflicting interests, such as in a closed 
economy when all unions decide to increase the wage for all employees on the basis of a 
wage-formula, cooperation can be achieved through a convention. When there are 
conflicting interests, cooperation entails risk for individual actors, as other actors can opt 
not to cooperate, making the co-operators worse off. However, when interactions are 
repeated, fear of retaliation can lead to the emergence of cooperation. A good example of 
the emergence of such an order in behaviour, or cooperation, is pattern bargaining (e.g. 
Traxler and Brandl 2009). In the context of transnational wage coordination, it is certainly 
true that interactions are repeated with every wage bargaining round. If retaliation is 
feasible, i.e. repaying non-cooperation with non-cooperation in the next round, 
cooperation could be sustained. Whether retaliation is a feasible and desirable choice of 
action in the transnational wage coordination context is debatable. It might entail repaying 
undercutting with undercutting, i.e. willingly taking a step back in the short run with the 
hope of establishing cooperation in the long run. This step back, however, entails 
significant social costs and would be unlikely to find general acceptance.  
Cooperation can also arise when multiple actors with conflicting interests engage 
each other in this type of interaction. In this case, information about actors’ behaviour in 
one interaction can become known to the actors they will interact with in the next. In this 
way, reputation can help convince others to take the risk of cooperating, while the actor 
has an incentive to maintain a reputation as a good co-operator. This is known as indirect 
reciprocity. Building a reputation for cooperation certainly appears to be a feasible and 
desirable strategy for trade unions and would increase their transnational counterparts’ 
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willingness to risk co-operative strategies. The effectiveness of indirect reciprocity is, 
however, tied to the number and frequency of interactions with different actors, which 
remains an open question in the wage bargaining context.    
Alternatively, cooperation can be motivated by communal rather than strictly 
individual interest. When actors identify with the goals of the “we”, effective cooperation 
can be achieved. As argued above, trade unions are not narrowly self-interested actors, 
they are also guided by ideological considerations. If these ideological considerations can 
be oriented towards the goal of transnational cooperation and carry sufficient weight in 
trade union decisions, effective cooperation may be realized.  
A third motivation for cooperation is altruism. This is the case when one union is 
willing to incur costs for the benefit of others. The (empirical) question however is how 
important the altruistic behaviour of trade unions is. There are various examples in history 
of the individual altruistic behaviour of humans so it would be wrong from a theoretical 
perspective to rule out the possible altruistic behaviour of trade unions and how it could 
be established per se. In any case, altruistic behaviour can help establish the fourth 
motivation for cooperation among unions: social norms in the form of sanctions for non-
cooperation. Such norms foster cooperation if each actor can expect to be punished for 
not cooperating and the cost of punishment exceeds the benefits of not cooperating. The 
problem here is that punishment is costly and a public good, i.e. others cannot be excluded 
from the cooperation-enhancing benefits of punishment. Thus strictly self-interested 
actors would prefer to free-ride rather than to contribute to punishment. Therefore, 
sanctions for non-cooperation can only be enacted if at least some actors in the system 
are willing to altruistically bear the cost of punishment.  
Conclusions: from factors to actors and back again 
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In this article, we presented a general micro-theoretical framework to answer the 
questions of why trade unions are behaving in a similar way, are cooperating (or not) and 
thus why the outcomes of their actions are similar in the context of European industrial 
relations.  
 On the basis of this theoretical framework we elaborated why in the past three 
decades unions have increasingly failed to meet their goals, e.g. increasing the wage 
share, and why unions in different countries are not cooperating in an intentionally 
strategic way in order to push their interests sufficiently. We argued that the reason why 
they are not cooperating is not that there are no motives for cooperation, but rather that 
the current forms of cooperation are either insufficient and/or transnational cooperation 
is weighted by unions which are embedded in distinct national contexts and considered 
to be less important. Referring to the motives of cooperation, there seems to be a lack of 
a European “we” among trade unions, as well as in their altruistic nature. On the one 
hand, there seems to be evidence that intentionally planned forms of transnational 
cooperation are not functioning, as outcomes are still detrimental to union goals. On the 
other hand, there seems to be evidence that implicit cooperation via norms and perhaps 
also unintentional cooperation via spill-overs mechanisms of action are potentially 
functioning quite effectively. As far as empirical evidence for cooperation via norms 
exists, this form of cooperation explains exactly the trends in outcomes, e.g. declining 
wage shares.  
Assuming that the goals and motives for cooperation by unions are determined by 
unions themselves, from a policy-making perspective, an interesting question is how a 
European wage policy/strategy can be realized. Given that unions will still be autonomous 
actors, a common wage policy can only be achieved by transnational cooperation between 
unions. Independent of the goal of any transnational, e.g. European, wage strategy, it is 
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essential to know which of the three identified and presented forms of cooperation, i.e. 
explicit and intentionally planned cooperation, implicit cooperation via norms, and 
unintentional cooperation via spill-overs mechanisms, are most efficient as well as 
politically realistic and governable?  
This question is however an empirical one and the framework developed in this 
article provides a theoretical basis for empirical investigations of actions and interactions 
of European industrial relations actors. Moreover, the theoretical framework developed 
here provides a micro-level backbone for academic and policy-oriented analyses which 
forms the basis for answers to these questions. Specifically, the presented theoretical 
framework defines not only the goals and motives for action and interaction but also 
defines the forms of interaction for any actor. Given that the number of industrial relations 
actors in Europe is very high and because there is a myriad of possible interactions 
between actors, any comprehensive, fine-grained and policy relevant, i.e. realistic, model 
of European industrial relations is very complex. In addition, the actors are heterogeneous 
in the sense that even though all are characterized by the same set of goals and motives, 
the relevance, i.e. the weighting, of the different items as well as of links between actors 
in the network are not necessarily the same. However, questions on the relevance and 
weight of both links and items are not a theoretical matter but are “simply” empirical 
questions.  
Thus, any attempts in modelling a realistic portrait of European industrial 
relations actors’ motives and interactions must face the challenge that the European 
industrial relations system is highly complex. However, this underlying complexity is not 
unique to European industrial relations research alone, the analysis of complex systems 
being a generic theme and problem in many sciences, including social sciences, for which 
various methodological approaches have been developed in recent years. One important 
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methodological approach is the so-called agent based model (ABM) methodology which 
has become increasingly popular in social sciences (e.g. Gilbert and Troitzsch 1998) with 
Freeman (1998: 19) being the first to highlight the usefulness of ABM in the field of 
industrial relations. ABM is a computer simulation based bottom-up methodology which 
explores the microfoundations of macro phenomena or patterns. The modelling approach 
concentrates on the actions and interactions of agents, i.e. actors, and rests on four 
principles (Macy and Willer 2002): first, agents are autonomous, i.e. make their own 
decisions; second, they are interdependent, i.e. agents consider the actions of other agents 
as relevant for their own decisions or at least the consequences of decisions of others are 
relevant; third, agents act according to rules; and fourth, agents are adaptive and 
backward-looking, i.e. they learn from their past actions. It is striking that these principles 
match fully with trade union actions in Europe and the theoretical model presented in this 
article. 
ABM reflect Coleman’s methodological boat as macro factors, e.g. the 
internationalisation of the economy, are not irrelevant because they constrain and 
influence the actions of agents, whose interactions then aggregate as new macro-
outcomes. The core of the ABM approach is on the bottom of the boat, i.e. in the 
causalities of individual action and interaction which are outlined in this article. Once the 
theoretical and empirical basis is defined the actions and interactions of all agents are 
computationally simulated and their effects, i.e. the outcomes at macro-level, are 
calculated, i.e. emerge.  
Although the ABM approach is appealing for the analysis of complex systems 
which consist of a myriad of autonomous and heterogeneous actors, it does, of course, 
have limitations which mainly rest on its artificial, i.e. computer based, nature. 
Nevertheless ABM can be very helpful in understanding European industrial relations 
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since there is no (strong) central coordination of trade union actions and phenomena 
emerge in the complex and multi-layered European system of interaction. However, once 
an ABM is created which is able to describe and explain current and past phenomena in 
European industrial relations it can be very useful for testing different scenarios. In other 
words, ABM offers a method to analyse different hypothetical configurations of actor’s 
interactions in different and changing configurations. Thus, they can give very precise 
information about what would be the outcome in the case of institutional change (Casti 
1996). Thus it is useful for informed public policy making and institution building. In this 
article we presented a micro-theoretical framework of industrial relations actors, i.e. trade 
union, action and interaction which provides the theoretical backbone for further studies 
which enable informed policy making.  
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Figure 1. The development of collectively agreed wages in Europe, 1999-2012 
 
Note: Continuous lines show the (unweighted) average of yearly real increases (in 
percentages) in collectively agreed wages in 17 European countries from 1999 to 2012. 
Dashed lines show the standard deviation for each year across countries. Thin lines show 
the respective trend over the period. Country sample was based on the availability of 
comparable data and includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Aumayr-Pintar et al. (2014). 
 
 
